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The literature on high school exit exams has found both positive and negative effects of
these high stake exams on high school graduation rates. To this point the literature has
not taken into account the embedded nature of school districts within state education
systems. We employ a Bayesian Hierarchical SLX model to account for the hierachical
nature of education data in the United States. Our approach also allows us to account
for spatial spillovers that influence graduation rates across districts and states. Using
school district and state-level data for 45 states and 8194 school districts in the United
States in 2015, we generally find no statistically significant effect of state exit exams
on high school graduation rates. Random effect coefficients, however, point towards
high school exit exams being negatively associated with graduation rates in a handful
of states.
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1 Introduction
The widespread consensus that high school diplomas displayed low academic skills and stan-
dards in the latter half of the twentieth century led to policies favoring high–stakes school
exit exams in the US. The deficiency of job skills and college preparedness in high school
graduates were mostly attributed to social promotion (Reardon and Galindo, 2002) and to
‘watered–down’ curriculum (Bond and King, 1995). This view was supported when evidence
of students’ lack of proficiency in primary subjects were compared to those of other countries
during the Cold War era and was further emphasized with the publication of A Nation at
Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform (Warren et al., 2006).
The Nation at Risk report stated that “the educational foundations of our society are
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a
Nation” (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 112) and that “more
and more young people emerge from high school ready neither for college nor for work” (Na-
tional Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983, p. 117). As a remediation measure, the
report also recommended, among other things, regular use of standardized tests of achieve-
ment that “should be administered at major transition points from one level of schooling to
another and particularly from high school to college or work” (National Commission on Ex-
cellence in Education, 1983, p. 125). These exams are considered to be ‘high stakes’ “if they
carry serious consequences for students or for educators” (American Educational Research
Association, 2000). For students an example would be if failing to pass an exam meant no
high school diploma. For educators, it might bring public scrutiny and less financial rewards.
Widespread implementation of these high-stakes exit exams by states started as early
as 1980s and has increased over time. Fourteen states enforced these exams in 1990 and
the number grew to 18 in 2000 (Warren et al., 2006). As of 2013, 23 out of 50 US states
have implemented this policy (Ed Counts Research Center, 2017). Figure 1 shows states
with and without state exit exams in 2013. The color grey represents states without the
state exit exam requirement, whereas the color black represents states with state exit exam
requirement.
The stated goal of these exams was to encourage students and school districts to demon-
strate that they had achieved competency in certain areas prior to graduation. Theoretically,
the effect of exit exams on graduation rates is ambiguous. Exit exams could combat social
promotion by some districts, leading to lower graduation rates. On the other hand, the
stigma and competitive effect of reported statewide exam scores could lead to an increase in
graduation rates.
A number of papers have been written on the effect of exit exams on educational outcomes
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Figure 1: States with and without State Exit Exams
Source: Ed Counts Research Center (2017).
such as high school completion rates, dropout rates and dropout likelihood, earnings, and
graduation rate. Greene and Winters (2004), Warren and Jenkins (2005), and Warren et al.
(2006) find no effect of state exit exams on high school completion rates. Warren and Edwards
(2005) find no effect of high school exit exams on dropout rates. In contrast, Hemelt and
Marcotte (2013) report that high school exit exams increase dropout rates among twelfth
graders. Beardsley and Berliner (2002) finds high stakes exams increase dropout rates, while
Papay et al. (2010) finds a negative influence on dropouts. Ou (2010) finds mixed results of
exit exams on dropouts. With respect to earnings, Warren et al. (2008) reports no effect of
high school exit exams on earnings.
In terms of graduation rates, studies such as Beardsley and Berliner (2002) and Marchant
and Paulson (2005) find state exit exams to negatively affect graduation rates. Baker and
Lang (2013) finds no statistically significant effect of high school exit exams on graduation
rates. While Beardsley and Berliner (2002)’s study was a qualitative study, Marchant and
Paulson (2005)’s and Baker and Lang (2013)’s study was quantitative. However, these
studies only take state factors into account without accounting for school districts that are
embedded within states.
While these studies look at the impact of high–stakes exit exams on graduation rates,
they do not empirically account for the embedded nature of school districts in state education
systems. In addition to the hierarchical nature of school data in the United States, school
districts have spatial spillovers in terms of policies, teacher labor markets, and student flows.
For example, one district in a region raising teacher salaries will likely influence other districts
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to raise their salaries or risk losing teachers on the margin. To our knowledge, no studies have
empirically accounted for spatial spillovers across school districts and the fact that school
districts are embedded in states that have different school-related policies. We fill this hole
in the literature by employing a Bayesian Hierarchical SLX model. While we find that non–
spatial papers miss important spatial spillovers across school districts, we generally find no
statistically significant evidence that states with exit exams have higher or lower graduation
rates than states without such exams. There does appear to be heterogeneity across states,
with the random effects showing a handful of states having a negative and statistically
significant relationship between exit exams and graduation rates.
There are three major advantages of using a hierarchical model that we highlight. First,
these models help to represent data structures that are close to the real world. These models
help to separate individual effects, in the case of this study, school–district level effects on
high school graduation rates, from the state level effects. This makes it a closer representation
of the real world data structure than a normal linear model. Second, by acknowledging that
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) violates the independence assumption in hierarchical data,
it helps correct biased estimates that OLS doesn’t. In our case, OLS would take the school
districts within a same state as independent from one another, when they clearly are not
as they have to take the same state exit exam. This is one of the main identifying features
of this paper compared to previous studies in that it takes this key violation into account.
Third, it allows for the use of state-level variables to control for state-level variation in policy,
in this case whether or not there is a state exit exam. While our results are not causal, they
allow us to use a single cross–section of states and still obtain measures of heterogeneity
across those states that can be used to identify situations for other more appropriate causal
inference approaches.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical specifi-
cation and statistical methodology used in this paper. Section 3 describes the data in detail.
Section 4 describes the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Statistical Methodology
2.1 Hierarchical Models
In their natural state, some data have a hierarchical structure to them. For example, students
nested within a classroom, counties nested within states, and school districts nested within
states. Hierarchical structure violates the independence assumption since school districts
within the same states are exposed to the same set of state laws. In case of this study, school
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districts within a state are affected by a state exit exam, hence, violating the independence
assumption as they are exposed to the same set of information. If not used in their natural
state, data can provide biased estimates.
In addition to the three advantages mentioned in the introduction, hierarchical models
have at least two additional benefits. The fourth advantage of hierarchical models is that
they nest classical regression models and, therefore, account for the fact that each upper
level unit intercept is different (intercept of each state in our paper) but also have some
similarities. To explain this concept more clearly, we refer to Gelman and Hill (2006) who
state that “classical regression model can be viewed as special cases of multilevel models.”
Here, αj ∼ N (µα, σα). Ignoring any heterogeneity and assuming a common intercept for
all “upper–level” units (i.e., 45 separate states in our paper), the first model is called a
fully–pooled model. It assumes that all states are homogeneous and should have a common
intercept. On the other hand, a no–pooling model assumes heterogeneity among the states
and allows for including a dummy variable for each state. Basically, this model allows all
states in our paper to be different from one another.
To explain this further, the matrix form of the hierarchical SLX model representation is
given by the following equations, following Chib (2008):
y = X̃β + ∆u+ ε ε |σ2 ∼ N (0, σ2IN)
u |τ 2 ∼ N (0, τ 2IJ)




X W1X ∆Zγ ∆W2Zδ
]
. The dependent variable y is a N × 1 vector
of observations and represents graduation rates. X represents the matrix of explanatory
variables at the district level and has dimension N ×k. The β is a k×1 vector of coefficients
associated with X. The ε is the error term and is normally distributed with a 0 mean and
variance of σ2In and has dimension N × 1.
The u represents the J × 1 vector of individual intercepts (state–level intercepts in our
study). Z is the vector of explanatory variables (that also includes a constant term) with
dimension J × m. γ is a J × m vector of coefficients associated with the Z term. τ 2 is
normally distributed with a 0 mean and variance of σ2IJ and is dimension J × 1. As is
standard in hierarchical models, we assume that ε and u, u and X, and u and Z are not
correlated (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
This model is also called an “intercepts–as–outcome” model. It is called so because
the “Level 2 equation has the Level 1 intercept as its dependent variable (as its outcome)”
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(Adewale et al., 2007). It is also called a “random intercepts” model. Understandably, it is
also called so as for each state, it sets a baseline of graduation rates. The individual school
districts’ graduation rates then varies around this baseline for the state it is embedded in
due to, for instance, differences in spending per pupil.
Gelman and Hill (2006) argue that data could estimate the level 2 error variance and
that they “see no reason (except for convenience) to accept estimates that arbitrarily set
this parameter to one of these two extreme values.” Here, we can assume that each state is
different but also share similarities (Lacombe and Flores, 2017).
The fifth advantage of the hierarchical model is that it corrects for any potential bias
that might arise from choosing either only the “fully–pooled” model or the “non–pooling”
models. Intercepts in a hierarchical model are a linear combination of the “fully–pooled”
model and “no–pooling” model and can be written as (Subramanian, 2010; Luke, 2004):
α̂EBj = λjα̂
NP
j + (1− λj) α̂FP
λj =
τ 2
(τ 2 + σ2/nj)
where, α̂NPj represents the “no–pooling” intercept estimate, α̂
FP
j represents the “fully–
pooled” intercept estimate, and α̂EBj represents the “empirical Bayes” or “shrinkage” es-
timate of the linear combination of the “no–pooling” and the “fully–pooled” models. λj
represent the weights assigned to each aforementioned models and are a function of both
level error variance (ie., variance of the school–district level and the state level ) and, nj, the
number of level 1 observation in each level 2 unit.
The empirical Bayes works in the following manner. If nj is small, λj is small, which
means that α̂EBj , the empirical Bayes, moves close towards the fully–pooled estimate, α̂
FP
j
. Similarly, if nj is large (such as the number of school districts in the state of Texas, ie.,
808 in our sample), λj is large, which means that α̂
EB
j , the empirical Bayes, moves closer
towards the no–pooling estimate, α̂NPj . Here, more weight is placed on the “no–pooling”
intercept estimate. Hence, the advantage in using the empirical Bayes is that it corrects for
any possible bias from choosing either “no–pooling” or “fully–pooled” model at random.
We now extend this basic intercept hierarchical model by adding a spatial factor to it.
We use the Spatial Lag of X (SLX) model at both levels of the hierarchy. A SLX model
provides a much richer set of results as it allows for local spillovers. As it includes spatially–
lagged independent variables (which capture local spillovers), it calculates the direct effects
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(own effects) as well as the indirect effects. The direct(own) effects calculate the effects of
the explanatory variables on the dependent variables; the indirect effects (spillover effects)
capture the effect of neighbors on the dependent variable.
2.2 The Hierarchical SLX Model
The matrix form of hierarchical Spatial Lag of X model representation is given by the fol-
lowing equations:
y = X̃β + ∆u+ ε ε |σ2 ∼ N (0, σ2IN)
u |τ 2 ∼ N (0, τ 2IJ)




X W1X ∆Zγ ∆W2Zδ
]
as illustrated before. The difference between the
previous model and this model is the addition of the W1X matrix and is what makes this
model a spatial econometric one. W1X is a spatially–weighted explanatory variable matrix
at the district level. Again, as before, the addition of spatially–weighted explanatory variable
matrix W2Z with J×m dimension allows for spillovers at the state level. γ is a m×1 vector
of coefficients associated with the W2Z term, and we assume that ε and u, u and X, and u
and Z are not correlated (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
We use Bayesian econometric methods for our analysis and the priors used in this study
are independent, hence, can be multiplied with one another. They are also proper priors and
also are conjugates. Priors for β and γ are multivariate normal whereas priors for σ2 and τ 2
are inverse–Gamma. Since we use uninformative values even though we use proper priors,
we use a multivariate normal prior of mean 0K vector and covariance 1000× IK for β and γ
where K represents the number of explanatory variables used in the study. The shape and
scale parameters for the inverse–Gamma prior are set to 0.001.
We rely on a Gibbs sampling method to obtain our estimates since obtaining closed form
solutions of the parameters analytically can only occur under special circumstances. Since
the Gibbs sampler only requires that the conditional distributions be available, we rely on
this method to obtain estimates.
The model we are estimating in this study is a local spatial econometric model. It is one
among the two types of spatial econometric models, the other one being a global model. In a
local model, spillovers in the independent variables are allowed. In case of our study, they are
represented by the WX and WZ terms. Unlike a local model, global model, however, also
contains a Wy term in addition to WX and WZ, allowing the spillover effect to disseminate
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across the entire sample.
We use a local spatial econometric model because school districts are closely situated to
each other and it is unlikely that any spillovers are going to propagate across the entirety of
the United States. It is most likely to be contained within a specific geographical range. In
addition, we use a local model because the structure of our data is hierarchical in its natural
state. Since, each state is different in terms of socioeconomic factors, allocating all states as
homogeneous would lead to biased estimates of graduation rates. Moreover, local spillovers
are a common occurrences in modelling regional patterns than global spillovers (LeSage,
2014). To put this statement in perspective in relation to our study, one would assume
graduation rates in a given school district in Maine to be affected by its close neighbors than
to be influenced by school districts in Florida.
In addition, the coefficients of local spillovers models as the SLX used in this study are
easy to interpret as compared to global models such as the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM).
In our model, all the coefficients have a straightforward interpretation. At the district level,
β represents its own partial derivative (direct effects) and θ represents the cross–partial
derivatives (indirect/spillover effects). The total effect is represented by β + θ. At the state
level, γ represents the direct effect and δ represents the indirect effect. The total effect is
represented by γ + δ.
3 Data
3.1 District Level Data
At the school district level we use high school graduation rates as the dependent variable. The
dependent variable is the high school graduation rate of public school districts of 45 states
and excludes charter schools and private schools. There are 8,194 individual school districts
in our study. Since it is a spatial econometric approach, we exclude Alaska and Hawaii in
our calculation as they have no contiguous neighbors. We also do not capture public school
districts in Ohio, Utah, and Vermont due to missing data. The data for graduation rates is
obtained from individual states’ Department of Education website.
High school graduation rates have been a subject of debate in the education literature.
Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) report that graduation rates differ from anywhere between
66% to 88% depending on the definition, sources, or methods used. The definition of high
school graduation rates differ from “dividing the number of public high school diplomas
by an estimate of the number of students who would have received diplomas that year
if graduation rates were 100 percent” (Greene, 2001) to the government mandated Four-
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year Adjusted Cohort Graduation Rate (ACGR) implemented by the U.S. Department of
Education. The ACGR is calculated “as the number of students who graduate in four years
with a regular high school diploma divided by the number of students who entered high
school four years earlier (adjusting for transfers in and out, émigrés and deceased students).
(US Department of Education, 2017)” Despite the differences in measures of calculating
high school graduation rates, we use the government mandated definition and rates as they
provide with a uniform measure across all school districts.
We employ an education production function approach to modeling graduation rates.
Hanushek (1986) categorizes inputs into education production as either family inputs, school
inputs, or peer inputs. There is a large literature on the inputs into education production
and we use variables that are standard in this literature (Hanushek et al., 2009). In this
study, Log of Mean Household Income and Log of Children from Single Family Household
fall under family inputs category. Log of Mean Household Income is the mean household
income in a school district in 2012 inflation–adjusted dollars. Log of Children from Single
Family Household represent the percentage of school-age children in a school district coming
from a single parent household where the mother is present but not the father. Palardy
(2013) found traditional family structure (consisting of both parents in the household) to
positively affect high school graduation rates.
In addition to family inputs over which school districts have no control, there are school
district inputs that may affect high school graduation rates. The variables that fall under
this category are Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil, Teacher Student Ratio, Local Revenue
as a % of Total Revenue, and Log of Expenditure per Pupil. Log of Instructional Salary
per Pupil represents expenditures on salaries of staff categorized as instruction, such as
classroom teachers. Teacher Student Ratio is also hypothesized to have a positive effect
on graduation rates (Krueger, 2003). It is calculated as the number of enrolled students
in a public school district divided by the total number of teachers. Reardon and Galindo
(2002) find a negative relationship between student–teacher ratio on dropout rates. Local
Revenue as a % of Total Revenue is calculated by dividing total local revenues by the total
revenue. Hoxby (1999) and Hall (2007) provide evidence that school districts where more
revenue comes from local taxpayers have better outcomes, other things being equal. We also
include Log of Expenditure per Pupil as literature such as Jackson et al. (2016) find a positive
relationship between increases in per pupil spending and completed years of education.
Finally, racial fractionalization index within a school district is represented by Racial
Fracitionalization Index and serves as a Peer Input. It measures “the probability that two
school district residents drawn randomly will be of different races” (Hall and Leeson, 2010).
This measure intends to capture the differences in provision of education that might arise due
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to disagreement over education production that are correlated with race. Hall and Leeson
(2010) find a negative relationship between a racial fractionalization index and school district
performance in Ohio.
3.2 State Level Data
While school–district level explanatory variables can be hypothesized to affect graduation
rates of school districts the most, state level policies also can have an effect. Therefore, we
use state exit exam as our state variable.1 Our state variable is a binary variable (State Exit
Exams) that equals one if the state requires a state exit exam for its high school students,
and 0 otherwise.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Year Source Mean SD
District Level Variables
High School Graduation Rates 2015 State Departments of Education 87.944 10.674
Log of Mean Household Income 2015 NCES 11.206 0.344
Log of Children from Single Parent Household 2015 NCES 5.427 1.502
Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil 2015 NCES 8.379 0.312
Teacher Student Ratio 2015 NCES 0.071 0.018
Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue 2015 NCES 42.611 19.776
Log of Expenditure per Pupil 2015 NCES 9.474 0.336
Racial Fractionalization Index 2015 Own Calculation from NCES data 0.332 0.207
State Level Variable
State Exit Exams 2013 Education Counts Research Center 0.46 0.50
NCES = National Center for Education Statistics.
N=8,194 for all Level 1 variables.
N=45 for the Level 2 variable.
Table 1 gives the summary statistics, year, and source for all variables used in this study.
4 Empirical Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the results from district level and state level SLX hierarchical model,
respectively.
We ran the Gibbs sampling algorithm through the full conditional distribution of each
of the parameters in this study. For each model, we ran 100,000 iterations using the Gibbs
sampling algorithm to get our parameters estimates. However, we discard the first 50,000
iterations as they are in the “’burn–in” phase. The remaining 50,000 iterations are used to
obtain parameter estimates.
1We are limited to one variable at the state level due to the fact that we are estimating fifty different
intercepts for every variable included at this level.
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In order to find the statistical significance of the parameters, we also calculate the 95%
credible intervals for each parameter as this is a standard practice in Bayesian analyses. We
do so to check whether the 95% credible interval contains 0 or not. If it does not, then
the parameter estimate has a marginal density away from zero, hence, suggesting that the
independent variable is statistically significant.
Determining the proper weight of the spatial weight matrix, W , is very important to our
analysis. For global models such as the SAR or SDM, its effect on the estimates are little
as long as LeSage and Pace’s (2009) recommendation is followed. However, that is not true
in the case of local models. Therefore, it is important to determine the most appropriate W
matrix in order to get correct estimates. We define the most appropriate W matrix as the
one that has the best goodness of fit as defined by the lowest Deviance Information Criterion
statistic (DIC).2
We find the correct W matrix for both levels in the following manner: we compare
nineteen different nearest–neighbor W matrices with neighbors ranging from 2 to 20. The
district level consists of a total of 19 different models and the state level consists of a total
of 9 different models. Therefore, there are 200 different models to choose from. If they are
thought of in a matrix form, in terms of our study, the rows represent school–district level
nearest neighbor W ′s and columns represent the state level nearest–neighbor W matrices.
We then use the Deviance Information Criterion statistic (DIC) to choose from the dif-
ferent models to determine the W matrix that is the most appropriate (Spiegelhalter et al.,
2002). The DIC statistic with the lowest number is the most appropriate model to use. In
our case, W matrix with 11 nearest–neighbor at the school–district level and with 2 nearest–
neighbors at the state level are the most appropriate spatial weight matrices to use.3 Using
the centroid of each school district, each school district’s neighbors are defined as the eleven
districts in that state whose centroid is closest. The same is done for states, except states
are only assigned two neighbors according to the DIC criteria.
4.1 District Level Results
Table 2 shows the average direct, indirect, and total effects of district level explanatory
variables on high school graduation rates. The results show that most of the variables of
2The DIC criteria is similar to a log-likelihood value but for a Bayesian context. It assesses model fit and
the number of parameters, penalizing overfitting (Darmofal, 2009).
3For those unfamiliar with spatial econometrics, it may not seem intuitive for a state to only have 2
neighbors, when many states have multiple neighbors under simple rook contiguity. It is important to
remember that the DIC criteria penalizes overfitting. While Tennessee may have eight neighbors by rook
continguity, the DIC criteria says its two nearest neighbors (measured by distance between state centroids)
provides the best model fit. Given regional convergence in politics (Heckelman and Dinan, 2013) and incomes
(Heckelman, 2013) it is not surprising that the best model fit occurs with a parsimonious number of neighbors.
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interest are statistically significant for all (direct, indirect, and total) effects.
Table 2: District Level Results with State Exit Exams as Level 2 Variable with 11 Nearest–
Neighbor W Matrix
Posterior Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
Direct Effects
Log of Mean Household Income 9.3033* 8.493 10.1245
Log of Children from Single Parent Household -1.2726* -1.4602 -1.0838
Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil 4.3249* 2.6365 6.0189
Teacher Student Ratio -27.436* -46.8731 -7.8065
Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue 0.0526* 0.0374 0.0682
Log of Expenditure per Pupil -4.6486* -5.7808 -3.5192
Racial Fractionalization Index -3.5688* -4.8667 -2.2621
Indirect Effects
Log of Mean Household Income -0.0057 -1.5882 1.5663
Log of Children from Single Parent Household -0.5792* -0.9559 -0.2028
Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil 0.8295 -2.6425 4.3186
Teacher Student Ratio -33.9301* -66.0164 -1.6151
Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue -0.0536* -0.0808 -0.0263
Log of Expenditure per Pupil 0.4016 -2.3622 3.1555
Racial Fractionalization Index -0.8901 -3.4078 1.6414
Total Effects
Log of Mean Household Income 9.2976* 7.8166 10.7666
Log of Children from Single Parent Household -1.8518* -2.2234 -1.4799
Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil 5.1543* 1.6651 8.6249
Teacher Student Ratio -61.3661* -97.8014 -24.8594
Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue -0.0010 -0.0264 0.0242
Log of Expenditure per Pupil -4.247* -7.0151 -1.4745
Racial Fractionalization Index -4.4589* -6.8034 -2.1044
Variance Posterior Mean
Level 1 Error Variance: σ2 8.4277
Level 2 Error Variance: τ 2 8.5092
DIC 2257805.39
Note: N=8194. * denotes variables with a 95% credible interval without a 0. The results above are the
level 1 (nested) results from a Bayesian Hierarchial SLX model where level 2 is the state. The aggregate
state level results are presented in Table 3 while Table 4 presents all of the state-level intercepts.
The direct effects are comparable to previous studies as they represent the raw beta
estimates in normal linear models. The own effects (direct effects) of all explanatory variables
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are statistically significant. Log of Mean Household Income is positively related to graduation
rates with a coefficient of 9.3033. Since this variable is log transformed, a 1% increase in
Log of Mean Household Income increases graduation rates by 0.09% (0.01 × 9.3033). Log
of Children from Single Parent Household is negatively associated with graduation rates. A
1% increase in Log of Children from Single Parent Household decreases graduation rates by
0.01%. As shown in the previous section, high school graduation rates is found to increase
in a traditional family structure where both parents are present (Palardy, 2013). Log of
Instructional Salary per Pupil is associated with an increase in graduation rates as well. A
1% increase in Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil increases the dependent variable by
0.04%. Higher levels of Teacher Student Ratio are negatively related to graduation rates.
Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue is associated with an increase in graduation
rates, consistent with Hall (2007). A 1% increase in this variable leads to a 0.05% increase
in graduation rates. Another variable used to explain variation in graduation rates is Log
of Expenditure per Pupil. Surprisingly, this variable bears a negative sign. The effect of per
pupil expenditures can be hypothesized to be positive because one can expect students to get
access to better resources which might subsequently lead to an increase in graduation rates
with increases in per pupil spending. A 1% increase in this variable decreases graduation
rates by 0.05%. While the direct effects of this variable on graduation rates is not found, as
mentioned in the previous section, Jackson et al. (2016) find a positive relationship between
increases in per pupil spending and completed years of education. Finally, Racial Fractional-
ization Index, is also negatively associated with graduation rates. If a racially homogeneous
school district, for instance, Macon County School District in Alabama with a Racial Frac-
tionalization Index of 0.05 were to become heterogeneous, for instance, like Brewton City
School District in Alabama with the index of 0.50, we would expect the graduation rate
to drop by 1.78%. Explaining this result in terms of economic significance, a one standard
deviation in the Racial Fractionalization Index (0.207) in a said school district decreases the
graduation rate by 0.73% (0.207×−3.5688) or only about 6.9% (0.207×−3.5688/10.67) of
the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Hall and Leeson (2010) also find diversity
to negatively affect educational outcomes.
Since we are using a spatial hierarchical model in our study, we are also able to test the
spillover effects or neighborhood effects, called indirect effects. One of the distinguishing
factors between this study and previous studies is that we account for indirect effects in our
analysis. The average indirect effect captures spillover effects of a change in an explanatory
variable in a school district and how that affects observations of the dependent variable in
neighboring school districts.
The indirect effects of a 1% increase in Mean Household Income in a school district de-
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creases graduation rates in surrounding school districts by 0.000057% and is not statistically
robust. Log of Children from Single Parent Household in a school district exerts a negative
effect on the graduation rates of its neighboring school districts. This variable is statistically
significant. An increase in Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil in a school district does not
spillover to the graduation rates of surrounding school districts in a statistically significant
manner. However, it exerts a positive effect. Like the direct effects of Teacher Student Ratio,
the indirect effect is statistically significant and also negative. This means that an increase
in Teacher Student Ratio in a school district negatively affects the graduation rates of sur-
rounding school districts. Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue increase in a school district
decreases the graduation rates of surrounding school districts. This may be due to the fact
that surrounding school district resources may be allocated to the referenced school district.
This variable is statistically robust as well. Log of Expenditure per Pupil in a school district
increases graduation rates in surrounding school districts and is statistically insignificant. It
may be the case that an increase in a school district expenditure per pupil increases funding
in surrounding school districts due to network effects, all else equal. As a school district
becomes more heterogeneous, graduation rates of surrounding school districts decreases.
The final effect is called the total effects and is defined as the sum of direct effects and
indirect effects. At this level, all variables of interest are statistically significant except for
the Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue variable. While Log of Mean Household Income
and Log of Instructional Salary per Pupil are positively related to high school graduation
rates, the remaining other variables exert a negative effect on the dependent variable.
4.2 State Level Results
As mentioned in Section 2, an advantage of using a hierarchical SLX model is its ability to
account for heterogeneity at the state level, unlike the standard fixed effects models and also
its ability to include spatially lagged independent variables at the state level. The inclusion
of spatially lagged independent variables provides us with direct, indirect, and total effects
at the state level as well. This variable accounts for the fact that states often engage in
yardstick competition in the adoption of policies. We take the DIC statistic into account at
the state level analysis also and use 2 nearest–neighbor spatially–weighed W matrix to get
our estimates. Table 3 reports the results at the state level.
As can be seen, neither (direct, indirect, or total) effects have a statistically significant
influence on graduation rates at the state level. State exit exams, while having a positive
effect, do not have a statistically significant effect on graduation rates after accounting for
state-level heterogeneity and spillovers. The stated goal of increasing competency in core
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Table 3: State Exit Exam Results with 2 nearest–neighbor W matrix
Posterior Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
Constant -9.0049 -25.0682 4.9573
Direct Effect 2.4626 -2.6976 7.6349
Indirect Effect 5.6681 -1.6215 13.0331
Total Effect 8.1307 -1.6644 17.7764
Note: N=45. * denotes variables with a 95% confidence interval with-
out a 0. The results above are the level 2 (top) results from a Bayesian
Hierarchial SLX model where level 1 are school districts. The school
district results are are presented in Table 2 while Table 4 presents all
of the state-level intercepts.
areas among high school students by conducting these high–stakes exams did not have any
statistically significant relationship with increasing graduation rates after controlling for the
embedded nature of school districts within states.
The random effects for each state are contained in Table 4 where entries in boldface type
represent estimates of the 95% credible interval that do not contain zero. Of note is that
the states of Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming
all have negative estimates of the effect of a state exit exam on graduation rates. These
negative results for these states highlight the heterogeneity across states in terms of the
subjects tested, standards, and cut scores (Center on Education Policy, 2009).4 Some states
use general core competency exams in subjects such as science and mathematics as their
high-stakes test, while other use end-of-course exams (Holme and Heilig, 2012). As Bishop
(2004) notes, a third of states in 2004 still used minimum competency exams as a graduation
requirement. If the purpose of high-stakes exit exams is to motivate students to achieve
more, Bishop (2004) argues that minimum competency exams provide little inducement to
try harder as additional work is not necessary for most students to pass.
The difference across states in terms of what is meant by a high-stakes exit exam helps
to explain both the differential intercepts in Table 4 but also the different findings in the
literature. For example, Baker and Lang (2013) find that minimum competency exams do
not affect graduation rates, but standards based exit exams are associated with declines.
Of these states, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Wyoming do not have high-stake exit
exams and thus the negative and statistically-significant coefficient suggests that high stakes
high school exit exams in these states would lead to a decline in high school graduation
rates, ceteris paribus. While our results cannot pinpoint why high-stakes exams in these
4They also highlight the heterogeneity in test-taking population, which can influence the effect of high-
stake exit exams depending on the type of exam (Bishop et al., 2000).
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Table 4: Individual Estimates for Each State
State Intercept Lower 95% Upper 95%
Alabama -8.06 -19.98 10.92
Arizona -15.54 -27.32 3.21
Arkansas -11.88 -23.71 7.05
California -11.96 -23.96 7.35
Colorado -21.04 -33.05 -1.93
Connecticut -14.77 -27.31 5.23
Delaware -15.17 -28.22 4.69
Florida -18.82 -30.73 0.06
Georgia -13.28 -25.10 5.70
Idaho -17.23 -29.17 1.82
Illinois -17.15 -29.11 2.07
Indiana -9.55 -21.52 9.66
Iowa -11.90 -23.91 7.41
Kansas -12.61 -24.68 6.76
Kentucky -7.32 -19.33 11.81
Louisiana -14.41 -26.39 4.60
Maine -14.40 -26.70 5.00
Maryland -14.14 -26.85 5.43
Massachusetts -16.46 -28.86 3.47
Michigan -19.18 -31.13 0.01
Minnesota -15.81 -28.03 3.92
Mississippi -18.69 -30.46 0.19
Missouri -8.31 -20.12 10.65
Montana -63.50 -76.51 -43.53
Nebraska -13.87 -26.82 5.71
Nevada -20.16 -33.17 -0.63
New Hampshire -15.45 -27.90 4.31
New Jersey -13.03 -25.37 6.75
New Mexico -24.02 -36.25 -4.74
New York -17.23 -29.80 2.84
North Carolina -11.83 -23.74 7.29
North Dakota -18.38 -30.80 1.41
Oklahoma -18.86 -30.60 0.02
Oregon -22.06 -34.17 -2.80
Pennsylvania -12.83 -25.00 6.72
Rhode Island -16.52 -29.27 3.26
South Carolina -12.26 -24.21 6.67
South Dakota -14.82 -26.77 4.31
Tennessee -8.64 -20.58 10.40
Texas -6.35 -18.15 12.68
Virginia -9.52 -21.56 9.70
Washington -21.05 -33.19 -1.58
West Virginia -11.86 -24.16 7.49
Wisconsin -10.72 -24.68 9.49
Wyoming -23.75 -36.39 -3.93
Note: Results are the state-level random effects from the
Bayesian Hierarchial SLX model estimated in Table 2 and
Table 3. Boldface represents estimates of the 95% credible
interval that do not contain zero.
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states would lower graduation rates, it suggests that looking at these six states would be a
fruitful avenue for future research. For example, Washington State’s exam was reported to
be extremely difficult (Harris, 2000; Shaw, 2002) and thus might encourage students to drop
out if they feel they are too far from passing.
5 Conclusion
Given the longstanding history of high stakes state exit exams on high school graduation
rates in the United States, it comes as no surprise that various empirical studies have found
mixed results. However, these studies do not take into account the hierarchical nature of
school districts and their embedded nature within state education systems. In addition, they
do not account for spatial spillovers.
We employ a Bayesian Hierarchical Spatial Lag of X Model to draw inferences. Given
the direct effects and spillover effects, we find that on average Mean Household Income and
Instructional Salary per Pupil positively affect high school graduation rates, whereas, Single
Parent Household, Teacher Student Ratio, Local Revenue as a % of Total Revenue, Expendi-
ture per Pupil, and Racial Fractionalization Index negatively affects graduation rates at the
school district. However, after controlling for hierarchical school–district level characteristics
and spatial spillovers, at the state level, we generally find no statistically significant evidence
of the effect of these high–stakes exit exams on graduation rates. Looking at the random
effects, several states have a negative random effects coefficient and a 95% credible interval
that does not contain zero. This heterogeneity in response is an avenue for future research,
perhaps using the synthetic control method.
Our contributions to the literature are the following. First, we employ a hierarchical
model to correct for results from previous studies which mostly used conventional linear
methods. Second, papers with non–spatial estimates do not account for spillover effects of
the explanatory variables on graduation rates. We are able to capture spatial spillovers in
the explanatory variables to explain differences in high school graduation rates. Third, we
are able to highlight heterogeneity in state-level effects of high-stakes exit exams that may
be useful for future research.
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